Introduction
Throughout the world, governments offer tax breaks and other incentives to attract capital and disperse economic development to lagging regions. In developed countries like the United States and Great Britain, the spatially targeted tax breaks imbedded in enterprise zones remain one of the few major urban policy initiatives. In less-developed countries, incentives are typically designed to steer industrial migration away from congested, core cities to outlying, peripheral areas.
The concentration of Puerto Rico's economic activity around the San Juan metropolitan area illustrates the core-periphery problem. The government has long had explicit policies to encourage economic activity in less-developed areas of the island. Nevertheless, the tendency of industry to cluster around San Juan remains strong, given the positive externalities associated with the major metropolis.
The aim of this paper is to assess the effect of regional incentive policies on new plant location choices in Puerto Rico.
While preferential taxes and other incentives continue to proliferate, there is considerable debate over whether they influence location, when other factors are considered (Bartik, 1991; Wasylenko, 1991) .
Before the late 1980s, many studies found that incentives do not affect plant location. However, with better measurement and more rigorous modeling, recent work has uncovered statistically significant tax effects in a variety of situations. The evidence is shifting toward the view that under some circumstances incentives do influence industrial location. In particular, recent findings suggest that incentives may be effective when smaller areas are considered. Papke (1993) argued that enterprise zones in the United States may have a stronger effect on the distribution of industrial activity within states rather than across states. In general, taxes may have more influence on intraregional than interregional location. When testing areas within a region, the locational choices may be close substitutes, possessing many similar economic characteristics. Accordingly, tax incentives would tend to be a major factor differentiating areas and have a discernible effect on investment decisions.
The 76 municipalities of Puerto Rico's main island (excluding two offshore islands) offer a good example of site selection choice in a small geographical setting. Once the decision has been made to locate in Puerto Rico, municipalities form a complete regional choice set. These small geographic units share many characteristics that influence location. For example, wages, energy costs, and other fundamental factors are similar across the choices. Major differences have to do with the urban economies or diseconomies of San Juan, infrastructural considerations, and incentives. Moreover, by focusing on one island, we were able to avoid the complications that arise when the choice set includes disparate incentive policies (as is the case with many cross-country and interregional studies of location).
The Puerto Rican incentive program potentially carries important lessons for the many countries now establishing targeted development zones. The policy deserves a close look because it has long been judged to be successful. Some studies have argued that incentives correlated with economic development in lagging areas (Woodward 1974) . These findings help sustain a spatial development policy that continues to this day.
The nested logit model employed in this paper was fitted to micro data on manufacturing plant openings by firms in Puerto Rico.
This analysis was possible because the Economic 1 Development Administration (Commonwealth of Puerto Rico), which set the incentive policy, kept detailed records of plant openings. These data, available for 1979 through 1986, allowed us to isolate and test location influences in a closed environment where tax incentives were administered by a single government agency.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section 2 explains the Puerto Rican incentive program. Section 3
shows how we applied the nested logit model to location decisions. Section 4 describes the independent variables.
Section 5 presents the results, which indicate the extent to which tax incentives affected intra-island location selection.
The last section summarizes the key findings and offers some concluding remarks.
The Regional Incentive Policy in Puerto Rico
The depending on their level of economic development and perceived need for assistance--with the least assistance given in the San Juan core zone. The governor ultimately has authority over which municipalities are included in the zones and which receive preferential treatment. While this is discretionary and sometimes political, the designation is justified by the need to deconcentrate industrial operations. The development authorities take into consideration the geographic location of the areas, the availability of the labor force, the existing infrastructure, and other factors that affect the economic and social development of particular municipalities. The governor can also reclassify any geographic area from one zone to another. As described earlier, the major provision was the exemption of up to 90 percent of a company's income from Puerto Rican income, property, and municipal taxes.
Specification Issues
The effectiveness of Puerto Rico's regional incentive policy was tested in a model of rational location decision making by firms. Apart from incentives, plants are built in municipalities depending on how local attributes raise firms' profits. Our basic assumption is that firms consider all relevant spatial data, including regional incentive advantages, and move to the area with the greatest potential profit. The specification issues involved in the model are explained in this section.
The influence of incentives on locational choice can be modeled as an outcome of profit maximization using discrete choice regression analysis. Discrete choice and other limited dependent variable methods are increasingly popular in applied industrial location modeling (Bartik, 1985 (Bartik, , 1989 Carlton, 1983; Coughlin et al., 1991; Florida and Smith, 1993; Friedman, Gerlowski, and Silberman, 1992; Head, Ries, and Swenson, 1994; Ondrich and Wasylenko, 1993; McConnell and Schwab, 1990; Schmenner et al., 1987; Woodward, 1992) . This line of research makes use of micro (firm-level) data to test the effect of taxes on site selection in a partial equilibrium context. These models are considered superior to ordinary least squares (OLS) when the dependent variable is discontinuous; in this case, the number of plants is a discrete variable and should be modelled as such (for more on this point, see the appendix).
The analysis was performed with nested logit, a discrete choice regression technique well suited to the core-periphery spatial structure of Puerto Rico. A generalization of the widely used conditional logit technique, the model's advantages for industrial location research are essentially twofold. First, the model can control for similarities among the alternatives.
Previous researchers discovered that tax effects emerged when they controlled for unobserved similarities among the choices.
Second, nested logit is computationally feasible even when the choice set is relatively large. It was possible to estimate the model with 76 municipality choices. For a more detailed discussion of the advantages of employing nested logit, see the appendix.
In our analysis of location choice in Puerto Rico, the decision to open a plant on the island has already been made.
The question is where to invest, and whether the economic development authorities can influence the intra-island migration of manufacturing plants.
The main island's 76 municipalities represent the choice set facing firms. Formally, each municipality can be represented by jJ. We modeled the decision process as a problem of random utility maximization (McFadden, 1981) . Associated with each choice is a profit level, $ =% + , composed of both a systematic This property would seem to be a drawback in location studies,
where the choice set is determined by political boundaries like states, counties, towns, and so forth. Although there are relatively simple statistical procedures to test whether the IIA has been violated (McFadden, 1987) , they are rarely reported. In some conditional logit models, dummy variables are introduced to "absorb the correlation" among the alternatives (Bartik, 1985; Woodward, 1992) .
The nested logit model (NLM) offers a more appealing way to control the correlation among alternatives. By clustering choices with similar attributes, the NLM is especially suitable when the choice set can be partitioned into mutually exclusive subgroups. With nested logit, we can test the degree of similarity across choices. As we shall see, conditional logit may be appropriate when there is no correlation. For a comparison of the CLM and NLM results using a similar model, see
the appendix to this paper.
To apply the NLM to location choice in Puerto Rico, we divided the island in two subgroups, or regions: CORE and PERIPHERY. The CORE region encompasses the 11 municipalities in the island's northeastern quadrant around San Juan, the capital and administrative center. This quadrant offers cost savings external to firms, but internal to the area. These external economies, which favorably influence profits, include information spillovers and the availability of specialized inputs. The San
Juan area has by far the most developed infrastructure--including the island's modern international airport, a well-developed financial center, the major port, and an express highway system--that makes the area a desirable location for business. The region also offers a wide spectrum of services and diverse cultural amenities not found elsewhere on the island. We structured our model to investigate why some firms choose sites in the developed municipalities around San Juan, despite greater fiscal incentives to locate in the PERIPHERY (the other 65 municipalities). The probability that a firm i locates at a municipality j within the CORE is the product of the probability of locating in the CORE, times the probability of locating at j conditional on the decision of locating in the CORE. More
In this expression, I is the "inclusive value" of the CORE, C where,
A similarly defined inclusive value for the PERIPHERY can be specified as I . In this case, if we interchange the subscripts P C and P, the probability of locating in a peripheral municipality is given by equation (1).
Profit, is assumed to be a linear Given that equation (1) is the product of two logit models, the NLM can be estimated sequentially. In the first step, the coefficients of the conditional probability model (the lower level) are estimated. Then, the inclusive values are computed from (2), and finally is estimated from a simple binomial logit with core and periphery as the choices (the upper level). In the 6 lower level, we tested municipalities' zone location and other characteristics on location choices within the two clusters of municipalities (the core and periphery). The construction of the choice set differs for the CORE and PERIPHERY. For the CORE, each observation (plant opening) comprises the actual location choice and the ten other municipalities in the San Juan metropolitan region. In the peripheral region, we restricted the number of choices to 10 randomly selected municipalities, plus the actual choice. McFadden (1978) showed that a random sample 7 of the alternatives yields consistent estimates of the parameters.
To summarize, acceptance of the NLM specification pivots on the inclusive value's coefficient, which reflects the degree of similarity across choices (or correlation of the utilities of the choices). If the null hypothesis that the estimated coefficient is 1 (no correlation) is accepted, then the CLM specification is appropriate. There is no need to run a nested model. On the other hand, when this estimate falls between 0 and 1, the nested structure of the model is justified (Maddala, 1983) . In general, choosing a municipality will affect profits both through product demand and costs. In this study, local demand is not pertinent since the plants were set up to export to the United States market (products are allowed duty free entry and considered American-made). We assume the price of export demand from Puerto Rico is identical for all municipalities. Constant prices by location can only be assumed, however, if the model accounts for varying transport costs and accessibility on the island, which we discuss shortly.
Data and Variable Construction
[ Table 1 Land costs also vary by location, but comparable costs for all 76 municipalities proved impossible to obtain. A reasonable assumption is that land prices vary according to population density, which has been used as a land price proxy in other studies of plant location (see Bartik, 1985) . In fact, POPULATION DENSITY would seem to reflect land cost differences better in our model of Puerto Rico. The high-density variable would not pick up positive market pull influences because the investments considered here are export-oriented. Instead, we expect that a higher population density will reduce the probability of choosing a given municipality.
Finally, we tested the regional incentive policy described in Section 2. The Economic Development Administration assigns municipalities to one of three zones, best characterized by their tax exemption periods: short (10 years or less); medium (greater than 10 years but less than or equal to 15 years); and long (greater than 15 years). We used two dummy variables to test the influence of the policy: ZONE1 and ZONE2. To construct ZONE1, we assigned a 1 for the low economic development municipalities that offered the longest tax holidays combined with the greatest state assistance; and 0 for other municipalities. The general regional incentive law described in Section 2, the 1978 Industrial Incentives Act, remained the same. However, for some municipalities, tax exemption periods and other incentives were changed in an attempt to alter the distribution of plant openings. These changes came in July 1982 , January 1985 , and October 1986 . The dependent variable was tested against the incentive policy in effect at the time of the decision. Table 2 displays the results of the nested logit regression.
Estimation Results
As described in the last section, the specification uses the medium-and high-incentive dummy variables (ZONE2 and ZONE1, respectively) to test the regional policy. Overall, the model is statistically significant. Correct signs are found for all the 10 coefficients. The estimates are statistically significant at the 1 percent level, except SAN JUAN DISTANCE, ZONE2, and ZONE1. The latter is significant at the 10 percent level. Testing alternative specifications convinced us that the results were not sensitive to this particular model. For example, we tested municipalities' manufacturing employment (rather than establishments) and the share of the working age employment base that had received vocational training. We found the estimates of the other variables in the model--their signs and significance--remained the same. Moreover, these tests showed us that the estimates remained stable and therefore that multicollinearity was not a problem.
[ Table 2 about here]
The viability of the nested structure is indicated by the coefficient of the inclusive value. Many CLM studies interpret the coefficients of the explanatory variables as approximating average elasticities (for example, Coughlin et al., 1991 ). Yet, the marginal effects [ Table 3 about here]
Summary and Conclusion
While the early industrial location literature often dismissed tax and other incentives, some recent evidence suggests that under certain conditions they can be effective. Summarizing contemporary studies of tax effects in U.S. states and localities, Bartik (1991, p. 36-44) suggested a "new consensus" was emerging. In particular, tax effects tend to be stronger when the competition consisted of small geographic units that share similar characteristics.
Puerto Rico offers a good environment in which to test the efficacy of incentive policies. The Commonwealth has long had an active policy for steering investment among its municipalities, but this policy's effectiveness has not been closely examined.
There are reasons to suppose that the regional incentives may affect profits and site selection in Puerto Rico. The island's tax exemptions translate into substantial savings because U.S.
subsidiaries do not pay U.S. taxes on Puerto Rican earnings.
Unlike U.S. states, the Commonwealth has the potential to tax firms at rates approaching the combined U.S. and local burden.
The allure of tax breaks is a major reason firms locate plants on the island. Why did we use nested logit as opposed to conditional logit?
CLM is a particular case of NLM (when the coefficient of the inclusive value is 1). The fact that the coefficient we found in Table 2 is significantly different from one is by itself an argument in favor of using NLM. Nevertheless, for comparison, the specification used to estimate the nested logit model (Table   2 ) was set up as a conditional logit model. In this case, the investor looks at all 76 municipalities at the same time, not in clusters as in the NLM. We also constructed a random sample of alternatives where we included the actual choice plus 10 from elsewhere on the island. As Table 4 reveals, the results are similar to the nested logit model. In either case, the incentive dummy variables were not statistically significant.
[ Table 4 about here] 1. Hansen (1987) is one of the few published papers using nested logit in examining site selection decisions. However, he did not test regional tax policy, which is central to this paper. Outside industrial location analysis, nested logit has been used widely in marketing, population migration, energy demand, transportation, and other areas. For a good discussion of the model and its applications, see Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) .
2. In 1996 the U.S. Congress passed legislation gradually phasing out the benefits of the possessions tax credit. Corporations doing business in a possession on October 13, 1995 may continue to claim the credit under a 10-year transition period.
3. Figure 1 shows that Puerto Rico includes two additional municipalities besides the 76 on the main island, the offshore islands of Vieques and Culebra, which we do not consider in our analysis. Little investment took place on these small islands.
4. Woodward (1974) differs from this paper in that it attempted to model employment demand in Puerto Rican municipalities rather than plant location decisions. The employment data available for municipalities is "potential" (not actual) employment and was not considered to be reliable for the purposes of the present study.
5. McFadden (1981) showed that if belongs to the unit interval, then the NLM is compatible with the Random Utility (Profit) Maximization hypothesis. For a more detailed discussion, see also Borsch-Supan (1990).
6. An alternative to the sequential estimation procedure is the full-information maximum likelihood (FIML) estimation. The FIML estimation of the nested logit model would directly yield asymptotically efficient parameter estimates (Hensher, 1988) , but is impractical when there are many alternatives as in this paper's model. The sequential estimation also yields asymptotically efficient estimates if the standard errors are corrected with the procedure developed by Amemiya (1978) , as is the case with the estimates presented in this paper. See also Brownstone and Small (1989) .
7. Since equal probability of inclusion was given to all municipalities in the PERIPHERY, there is no bias introduced by the sampling of alternatives.
8. The advantages of Ponce are mostly unique to the metropolitan area. Unlike San Juan, it does not possess advantages that tie all municipalities to it. Distance to San Juan is considered no matter where one locates in Puerto Rico. For Ponce, the advantages are particular to the municipality, and distance is NOTES not a critical factor for firms located elsewhere. Thus, we used a dummy rather than distance variable. Given the nested structure, it is tested only against other peripheral municipalities in the lower level.
9. If an increase in the probability to attract more investment would lead to a reclassification of a zone, we would have a endogeneity problem with the regional dummy variables. However, the classification of the zones is only partially determined by the variables that we have included in the model. The decision by the Puerto Rican Economic Development Administration is essentially political. It is affected by other factors than those we test. 10. A likelihood ratio test on the unrestricted and restricted models (where all the parameters set to zero) indicates that the null hypothesis, where all the coefficients are zero, can be rejected at the .0001 level of significance in the two models. A common statistic to compare logit regression results is the adjusted likelihood ratio index. Although it is sometimes considered similar to corrected R used in ordinary least 2 squares, Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985) note that there is no rule for evaluating when the adjusted value is high. In both 2 specifications, = 0.12. This value is considered a reasonably 2 good fit. It is close to those obtained in Hansen's (1987) model of location choices among Brazilian municipalities.
11. For CLM, it can be readily shown that the elasticity of the location probability with respect to an independent variable (a log specification) is . The average estimate of P is often used to get an average elasticity. Since j P is small when there are many choices, the elasticity is j approximately equal to the independent variable's coefficient. However, an individual choice probability could differ widely from the average. 12. Marginal effects for a NLM can be obtained by differentiating equation (1) with respect to one of the k explanatory variables (measured in logs). We obtain the elasticity of P with respect to X or, 
